12:00 - 13:30
Nádor 9., Budapest
CEU Business School Research Seminar Series
Institutional weakness is considered to be one of the primary factors that perpetuate bribery and corruption (Heinemann and Heiman, 2006, Chen at al., 2008). This article provides an analysis of anti-bribery institutions through the bribery case of Magyar Telekom in the Balkans. On the basis of the case I analyze the effectiveness of anti-bribery institutions on international, national and organizational level. National anti-bribery institutions are rather weak in transition economies which means that unlawful business behavior is rarely punished. As the risk of negative consequences of bribery is rather low less attention is paid to actual enforcement of anti-bribery institutions on company level. This setup is in conflict with international anti-corruption institutions. The aim of the analysis is to prove that the conflict is mainly due to different characteristics of institutions. Magyar Telekom’s story suggests that stronger internal institutions would have been able to prevent and/or mitigate the negative consequences of alleged bribery cases in Macedonia and Montenegro. The case
offers an understanding on how enterprises can best prepare their institutional systems to prevent, and if happens manage well, bribery cases.